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Abstract
Finding one’s way to a destination is a common, everyday task that often relies on spatial information provided by humans 
and/or automatic devices. However, the information can be inaccurate. How we decide which route to take will depend on 
our thoughts about the available route information, including who or what provided it, and how these sources may be associ-
ated with differential accuracy and fallibility. In three experiments (previously reported in Brunyé et al. (Q J Exper Psychol 
68(3):585–607, 2015)), we found that when route directions conflicted with the perceived environment, people trusted the 
landmark information other humans provided, but relied on the turn direction information from an automatic device. But 
what guides these behavioral results? Here we present a systematic linguistic analysis of retrospective reports that sheds some 
light on how information about the direction source affects cognitive focus. A focus on direction sources in the instruction 
triggered a cognitive focus on the direction source throughout. Participants who systematically switched strategies focused 
more on features of the scenario than those who did not. Non-switching strategies were associated with a higher focus on the 
participants’ own reasoning processes, in particular when relying on turn information. These results highlight how cognitive 
focus is guided by scenario factors and individual preferences, triggering inferences that influence decisions.
Keywords Cognitive focus · Spatial cognition · Decision-making · GPS · Uncertainty
Introduction
Imagine you are trying to find your way in a city, equipped 
with route directions. You are supposed to turn left at the 
church, but once you arrive at the church you find that you 
can only turn right, whereas you could turn left at the super-
market farther ahead. How do you decide which turn to take? 
What influences your decision, and what do you focus on 
to guide decision-making? Our previous research (Brunyé 
et al. 2015) showed that your decision will crucially depend 
on the nature of the direction source. If the source of your 
route directions is unknown, you will either go with the turn 
direction (i.e., decide to turn left even though this means 
turning at the supermarket rather than the church) or with 
the landmark (i.e., turn right instead of left at the church), or 
you might switch between the two approaches. However, if 
the source is an automatic GPS-based system, you are much 
more likely to rely on the turn direction—perhaps based on 
your experience that modern GPS systems typically pro-
vide accurate turn guidance but are either not well informed 
about or not updated with the latest landmarks. And if your 
source is a human, you will most probably turn at the indi-
cated landmark, even though the resulting turn direction 
mismatches the instructions. This landmark reliance seems 
to make sense as humans are known to rely on salient land-
marks to guide navigation (Steck and Mallot 2000) but also 
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confuse left and right, or they may have imagined you com-
ing from a different direction.
Strikingly, although the participants’ decisions in Bru-
nyé et al. (2015) seemed to make intuitive sense as just 
suggested, there is nothing inherent in the different route 
direction sources that associates landmarks with one source 
and turn directions with another. In fact, in retrospective 
reports, people gave inconsistent reasons for making par-
ticular choices. Nevertheless, they must have gone through 
a reasoning process that was sufficiently consistent across 
participants to lead to the strikingly clear patterns that we 
found. The information about the direction source must have 
turned a switch, so to speak, in people’s minds, leading them 
to consistently consider some aspects over others, such that 
GPS systems might be associated with reliable turn direc-
tion information and human route givers with landmarks. In 
this paper, we address the nature of this reasoning process 
and ask what factors might “turn the switch.” To assess the 
aspects prominent in people’s minds under diverse uncer-
tainty conditions, we present a systematic linguistic analysis 
of the highly diverse rationales given for decisions—ration-
ales that nevertheless led to homogeneous outcomes.
Participants in Brunyé et al. (2015) wrote a retrospec-
tive report following task performance, describing what 
was important to them when they made their decisions, and 
which things they paid attention to. As a surface exploration 
of these reports only showed high variability, they were not 
included in the earlier paper. This is a commonly observed 
phenomenon in cognitive science research. Verbal reports, 
because they are seen as too varied, complex, and incon-
sistent, are frequently discounted as unreliable introspective 
intuitions that cannot provide relevant insights into actual 
cognitive processes (Garner 1988). Here, we challenge this 
view by treating the data differently: not (only) as a direct 
resource to access participants’ conscious reasoning pro-
cesses, but more importantly as linguistic data that allow 
for further access into cognitive focus, which may be uncon-
scious. We combine qualitative (content) and quantitative 
(linguistic features) analysis using a methodological proce-
dure called cognitive discourse analysis (CODA; Tenbrink 
2015, 2020). This method analyzes verbal data to identify 
not only consciously verbalized thoughts, but also patterns in 
linguistic structure that highlight cognitive aspects of which 
speakers may not be aware. For current purposes, our spe-
cific interest lies in the participants’ cognitive focus when 
confronted with spatial uncertainty. We ask how information 
about direction sources as well as individual preferences for 
strategies affected participants’ cognitive focus, as reflected 
in their linguistic choices.
In the following, we explore three largely unrelated areas 
of research relevant to our current goals: how people follow 
route directions, how decisions are made under conditions of 
uncertainty, and how cognitive focus relates to verbalization 
of thought. We then introduce our experimental study and 
summarize relevant results previously reported in Brunyé 
et al. (2015), before addressing the new analyses of the ret-
rospective reports in the present paper.
Route directions
Verbal route directions have long been recognized as an 
important and revealing data source that highlights how 
people navigate spatial environments. They reflect crucial 
cognitive elements such as the sequential order of travel, the 
importance of choice points such as street intersections, the 
orientation toward landmarks, and the qualitative and vague 
way in which distance information is conveyed in temporal 
or spatial terms: First, walk straight ahead until the second 
crossing, turn left, walk for a couple of minutes until you 
reach the church… Such directions are typically accompa-
nied by gestures supporting the imagined walking direction, 
as in turn left accompanied by a hand wave to the left. All 
of this seems natural to us, and indeed, these elements of 
route directions are well established as a conventional part 
of our cultural repertory. They correspond to the information 
needed for successful route navigation (Daniel and Denis 
1998; Denis et al. 1997)—as opposed to additional, more 
individual types of information such as references to beauti-
ful scenery, opportunities to buy groceries, or the likelihood 
of heavy traffic, all of which people consider in choosing 
routes (Hölscher et al. 2011).
In different parts of the world, directions might sound 
very different. People might orient more toward ubiquitously 
available environmental features such as uphill and downhill 
(Brown and Levinson 1993), or they might rely on gestures 
that represent the actual direction of a place, rather than the 
egocentric orientation of the traveler (Le Guen 2011). The 
fact that route directions are necessarily embedded in a cul-
tural context is decisive for current purposes. For instance, 
the intuition that automatic GPS systems can be better 
trusted to provide turn direction information than to refer 
reliably to landmarks (Brunyé et al. 2015) must be related 
to culturally embedded knowledge about automatic devices’ 
capabilities (Rip 1989). This would be true independent of 
whether or not such knowledge is actually prominent in a 
wayfinder’s mind; much of it will be activated quickly and 
efficiently, without requiring substantial cognitive effort. 
However, it might be related to a distinct kind of cognitive 
focus, where subtle cues in a scenario guide attention toward 
specific aspects and away from others. Lepsien and Nobre 
(2006) demonstrated that cues can guide focus of attention 
on both a working memory and perceptual level. In our sce-
nario, the cultural knowledge associated with the direction 
source information might serve as a cue, making particular 
aspects of a direction source’s reliability prominent.
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Turn direction information is important in route direc-
tions for obvious reasons—the wayfinder needs to know 
which direction to turn at every choice point. In addition, 
knowledge of the general goal direction is a decisive cog-
nitive factor during navigation (Dalton 2003; Hochmair 
and Frank 2000), especially when explicit planning is not 
required (Hölscher et al. 2011). This might make turn direc-
tion information particularly prominent, as specific turns 
will contribute to the wayfinder’s knowledge about, and ori-
entation toward, the ultimate goal. Landmark information, in 
contrast, does not add to the wayfinder’s knowledge (or sense 
of direction) directly. Instead, landmarks anchor one’s posi-
tion in the environment, identifying specific locations rather 
than general directions. Both aspects—anchored localization 
and goal-directed orientation—combine in the case of vis-
ible distant landmarks, such as a salient tower located close 
to a navigation goal. However, such a coincidence may not 
happen often; more frequently, landmarks during wayfinding 
are associated with specific parts of the route (Lovelace et al. 
1999). Since knowledge about the general goal direction is 
decisive, it is not surprising that people rate turn directions 
as the most important element of route directions, followed 
by landmarks (Burns 1997). Also, unreliable landmarks can 
reinforce direction-based navigation strategies (Foo et al. 
2005).
Decision making under conditions of uncertainty
While research extensively examined how humans navigate 
known environments and follow accurate route directions, 
surprisingly little is known about navigation strategies when 
uncertain. However, it is actually fairly common for route 
directions to be less than entirely accurate. Reliable and 
complete route directions presuppose complete and accurate 
knowledge of the environment, which cannot be assumed 
even under the best of circumstances. Humans remember 
what is relevant for themselves, and this might mean that 
information relevant for the stranger asking for directions 
is not readily available (Tenbrink 2012). Moreover, men-
tal representations tend to be distorted (Stevens and Coupe 
1978; Tversky 1992), humans frequently confuse left and 
right (Storfer 1995), and their memory of landmarks and 
other spatial features might be outdated. In short, there are 
plenty of reasons why route directions may be incomplete 
or faulty. In line with this, a route giver’s uncertainty may 
be reflected in the way route directions are formulated (Ten-
brink et al. 2011).
In addition, route directions are often given orally in 
advance, with no possibility for confirming successful 
communication when enacting the directions. In addition 
to having to deal with possible misunderstandings, the way-
finder is confronted with a considerable memory load. Since 
there is no way of visualizing the entire route based on the 
sparse spatial detail usually provided in route directions, the 
wayfinder would have to memorize these directions in their 
entirety. This may be virtually impossible; it is a well-estab-
lished fact that retention of original wording fades quickly 
once comprehension has been completed (Sachs 1967), and 
that working memory faces substantial loads when people 
attempt to memorize a sequence of route instructions (Hund 
2016).
Taken together, all of these factors combine to explain 
why people frequently get lost in spatial environments, 
despite having been given good instructions. And frequently, 
as a consequence of the combined challenges, wayfinders 
are confronted with situations where the remembered route 
directions do not appear to match the environment. They 
might remember that they have to turn left at the church, but 
find that there’s only a right turn available at the church, or 
that the only left turn is at a bakery. How decisions are made 
in these very common situations is surprisingly unclear from 
the available wayfinding literature. Our previous study (Bru-
nyé et al. 2015) set out to explore people’s intuitive prefer-
ences and identified striking patterns for decision making 
under uncertainty that pointed to a strong influence of the 
direction source. However, the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses that led to these results remained unresolved.
What influences people’s decisions under other kinds of 
circumstances, and what goes on in people’s minds as they 
reach a decision? Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested 
that humans have a tendency to use a limited number of 
heuristics, leading to quick decisions and judgments rather 
than taking the entire complexity of available factors into 
account. According to Todd and Gigerenzer (2000), it is pre-
cisely this capacity of simplifying situational and cognitive 
complexity that enables humans to make smart decisions 
efficiently and successfully, especially when confronted with 
the (rather common) situation of having to deal with too 
many uncertainties to be able to account for all eventuali-
ties. If it is impossible or highly demanding to determine the 
objectively optimal solution on a rational basis, it is useful 
to be able to draw on a limited number of cognitive heuris-
tics to guide action. In the spatial domain, heuristics that 
have been identified to account for route choices include a 
preference for straight lines toward the goal direction with 
as few turns as possible (Dalton 2003; Hölscher et al. 2011; 
Sadalla and Staplin 1980), routes that head generally south 
rather than north (Brunyé et al. 2010, 2012), and routes with 
a particularly long stretch at the beginning (Bailenson et al. 
2000). Even distances are estimated on the basis of heuris-
tics (Hirtle and Mascolo 1991), and overarching navigation 
strategies are guided by spatial regions and conceptions of 
encompassing trajectories (Wiener et al. 2004). Altogether, 
there is clear evidence for cognitive shortcuts under different 
navigation circumstances, explaining humans’ ability to act 
even when hampered by uncertainty (Tenbrink et al. 2011).
290 Cognitive Processing (2020) 21:287–302
1 3
If decisions are guided by a limited set of heuristics, what 
guides people’s reliance on a particular heuristic? One possi-
bility is that individual differences generally account for stra-
tegic preferences, such as relying on landmarks as opposed 
to global directions (Lawton 1996; Pazzaglia and De Beni 
2001; Shelton and McNamara 2004). However, even strong 
personal preferences will be affected by situational factors 
(Lipshitz and Strauss 1997; Maule and Svenson 1993), as 
confirmed by our previous study (Brunyé et al. 2015): strate-
gies shifted from an even distribution between landmark vs. 
turn-based choices to a clear preference for turn direction 
information from automatic devices, and a clear preference 
for landmark information when the direction source was a 
clearly identified human being.
Cognitive focus and verbalization of thought
Cognitive shortcuts, such as decision heuristics, have the 
advantage of simplifying complexity, and guiding rational 
considerations within manageable limits (Todd and Giger-
enzer 2000). Inevitably, such a strategy will guide a person 
toward just those aspects of the situation that are relevant 
for applying the heuristics in question, in line with the basic 
conception of attention itself—as defined ingeniously by 
William James more than a century ago (James 1890):
It is taking possession of the mind, in clear and vivid 
form, of one out of what seems several simultaneously 
possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization and 
concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It 
implies a withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others.
Thus, a landmark-based navigation heuristic will guide 
attention away from other spatial information and center 
primarily on landmarks, just as a region-based strategy will 
mean that humans pay particular attention to existing regions 
in the environment (Wiener et al. 2004). Such attentional 
biases are regularly represented in language (Marchetti et al. 
2015). For instance, Talmy (2007) summarized many ways 
in which linguistic features reflect cognitive attention pro-
cesses, such as foregrounding particular aspects in sentence 
structure, lexical complexity (compare One of my parents’ 
sisters to One of my aunts), and the relative salience of Fig-
ures and Grounds (compare The bike is next to the house 
to The house is next to the bike). Furthermore, Carstensen 
(2015) demonstrated how spatial terms express perspectiva-
tions of space in various ways, related to mental operations 
of selective attention, preconceptions, and perceptions of 
space. For instance, the use of over and under is closely 
linked to visual experience of orthogonality to a horizontal 
line or plane.
Using linguistic devices such as these, attention is subtly 
represented by the way people formulate their utterances, 
including which aspects they choose to express at all (Talmy 
2000). For instance, theoretically, any movement from a 
place to another will contain a starting point, a trajectory, 
and an endpoint; however, speakers typically express just 
one of these: He left the house vs. She took the scenic route 
vs. They arrived at the school. Each of these clearly sig-
nals attention to just one aspect of the route—the one that 
is relevant in a current communication context. In a specific 
discourse context, a preference across speakers to refer to 
starting points (such as the house) more than trajectories 
(such as the scenic route) or end points (such as the school) 
therefore reveals their attention focus on the starting point, 
which in turn depends on the context of language production 
(Tenbrink 2015). Such a preference would naturally coincide 
with a preference for verbs that relate to the starting point 
(such as leave) over those that relate to the end point (such 
as arrive).
Verbalizations associated with specific thought processes 
can therefore reliably reflect cognitive focus, not only on the 
basis of what people happen to mention in a verbal protocol 
(Ericsson and Simon 1984), but also specifically by making 
use of this intricate capacity of language to represent atten-
tion (Talmy 2007). Analyzing the associated linguistic phe-
nomena in detail can reveal the attentional focus of speakers 
(Tenbrink 2020) in a way similar to detecting manipula-
tion of readers’ attention in news discourse (Alharbi and 
Bahmani 2015), based on the insight that readers’ attention 
is guided by the choice of particular expressions (Marchetti 
2010). In this study, we set out to examine whether differen-
tial cognitive focus was associated with the decisions made 
by participants under conditions of uncertainty, as expressed 
in language, using analysis criteria tailored to our specific 
scenario.
The experiment
As reported in Brunyé et al. (2015), we confronted partici-
pants with the dilemma of conflicting landmark and turn 
information. After reading a sentence such as turn right at 
the pharmacy, they were shown a situation in which they 
saw a pharmacy associated with a left turn and a right turn 
with a different landmark. This allowed us to directly differ-
entiate participants’ priorities when making their decisions. 
We expected that individual differences as well as informa-
tion sources would affect these strategies in systematic ways. 
In three conditions, we tested this prediction as follows. Par-
ticipants read route directions such as To get to the metro 
station, take a right at the Pharmacy toward a goal location 
in an unfamiliar environment. The environment was then 
shown as an abstract depiction consisting of a straight path 
and two short intersecting roads to the left- and right-hand 
side, respectively. At the end of each intersecting road was 
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a symbol that indicated possible goal locations, and partici-
pants were tasked to select the goal location they believed 
was correct. In many cases (serving as fillers), the route 
directions given to the participants accurately corresponded 
to the depicted environment, leaving no dilemma but only 
a simple route direction following task. In the experimental 
trials, the environment posed a dilemma and participants’ 
decisions could differentiate reliance on either landmarks 
or turn directions.
Three conditions differed only with respect to the source 
of route directions. In Brunyé et al. (2015) these were pre-
sented as individual experiments, but since the participants 
were taken from the same population they can be equally 
represented as between-subject conditions, which makes 
more sense for current purposes (cf. analyses spelled out 
below). In the control condition, participants did not receive 
any specific information about the direction source. The GPS 
condition contained information about an automatic GPS 
device that was either high or low in reliability. In the human 
condition, instructions elaborated on a human route giver 
who was described as either highly familiar or relatively 
unfamiliar with the environment. In the following, we pre-
sent details of each condition along with a brief account of 
the patterns of behavioral results previously found across 
the three conditions (experiments), as reported in Brunyé 
et al. (2015), before moving on to present the new analysis of 
retrospective verbal reports. In particular, we will examine 
what participants reported to be important for their deci-
sions, as well as systematically identifying linguistic features 
that highlight cognitive focus associated with the behavioral 
results.
Conditions
All three conditions addressed participants’ strategies when 
confronted with a route direction that conflicted with the 
perceived environment. Participants read a brief route 
instruction and were then shown a schematic top-down view 
of a spatial scene containing street intersections and land-
marks, on the basis of which they made a decision of where 
to go. After 64 tasks of this kind, participants were asked to 
describe how they solved the task in general terms and what 
they paid attention to, thinking back about how they did it.
In the control condition, participants were not given any 
particular information about the route source. This condition 
(Experiment 1 in Brunyé et al. 2015) explored individual 
differences in spatial strategy adaptation under conditions of 
uncertainty. We expected that participants’ decisions could 
be predicted by their personal preferences for either land-
mark- or turn-based information.
The GPS condition (Experiment 2 in Brunyé et  al. 
2015) was designed to test whether the strategies identi-
fied previously would carry over to a scenario where the 
route information was given by a source that is not nor-
mally associated with landmark information—an automatic 
GPS device. In line with current attempts to integrate such 
information into current systems (e.g., Burnett 2000; Hile 
et al. 2008), we further manipulated the assumed degree 
of reliability by either stating, in half of the cases, that the 
route was provided by a software that is “a first version of a 
new GPS device and is untested for accuracy and details,” 
and in the other half, that it is “the 4th version of a popular 
GPS device that has proven accuracy and details.” There 
were two versions of the low-reliability and two versions of 
the high-reliability devices, represented by distinct fictitious 
brands and logos.
In the human condition (Experiment 3 in Brunyé et al. 
2015), we asked whether human route givers might be 
associated with a different kind of fallibility than automatic 
devices. To ensure that participants conceptualized the 
direction source as a real human being, we provided them 
with a short description that included a gender-specific name 
(such as Michael or Sarah). The description also differenti-
ated between knowledgeable and less knowledgeable route 
givers by detailing that they were, in half of the cases, “vis-
iting” and had only been in town “for a couple of days,” or 
alternatively “born and raised in the town.”
Participants
One hundred and eighty Tufts University students (81 male; 
mean age 19.8 years; 60 in each condition) participated for 
monetary compensation. All signed informed written con-
sent in accordance with the Tufts University Institutional 
Review Board guidelines.
Materials
In each condition, 64 sentences described the way from a 
starting location to a final destination by reference to a land-
mark (a common salient location, such as a theater or hospi-
tal) at a decision point, as well as a turn direction (i.e., left 
or right). Half of the route directions included a left turn and 
the other half a right turn. The syntax was counter-balanced 
between the options a) To get to the hospital, take a left at 
the theater, b) To get to the hospital, at the theater take a 
left, c) Take a left at the theater to get to the hospital, and 
d) At the theater, take a left to get to the hospital. Follow-up 
analyses confirmed that these syntactic options had no effect 
on the results.
Each route direction was paired with one of 64 sche-
matic maps (see Fig. 1 for an example). Each map showed 
a black arrow at the bottom that indicated the orientation 
from the starting point, along with a street running verti-
cally upward from it. Further upward, two streets inter-
sected with the vertical one, one to the left and the other to 
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the right. In half of the maps, the one to the left came first, 
and in the other half, the one to the right. Each of these 
intersections had a landmark adjacent to it, represented 
with grayscale icons from Microsoft Office clipart framed 
by black rectangles. These were located either below or 
above, and to the left or right of, the intersections. Finally, 
a possible destination was shown at the end of each inter-
secting street, represented by a salient question mark in a 
black rectangle.
Critically, on half of the 64 trials, the information given 
in the route directions was consistent with the map (non-
dilemma trials), and on the other half, it was inconsistent 
(dilemma trials). For instance, an instruction could say: “To 
get to the bakery, take a right at the cell phone store”. How-
ever, in a dilemma trial, the cell phone store (the decision-
point landmark) would be adjacent to a left turn, whereas 
there would be an option to turn right at another landmark 
not mentioned in the instruction (e.g., a cinema). In half of 
the dilemma trials, the decision-point landmark was at the 
first intersection, and in the other half, it was at the second 
intersection. Participants indicated their choice by mouse-
clicking on one of the two question marks indicating a pos-
sible destination. In dilemma trials, their answer would be 
consistent with either the landmark information (e.g., taking 
a left turn at the cell phone store) or the turn information 
(e.g., taking a right turn at the cinema). In non-dilemma 
trials, their answers would be consistent with both parts of 
the associated route instruction, unless they made an error.
Procedure
After providing informed consent and reading task instruc-
tions, participants performed a practice trial and then com-
pleted the main experiment. The stimuli were 64 trials 
grouped in four blocks of 16 trials in random order, pre-
sented on 24” monitors using SuperLab® software (v4.5; 
Cedrus, San Pedro, CA, USA). In each trial, participants 
read a route direction consisting of a single sentence and 
clicked the mouse when they were ready. The next screen 
focused their visual attention to the monitor’s center by 
showing a grey box labeled “GO,” which participants had 
to click. This also served to position the cursor starting posi-
tion into the middle of the screen. The next screen showed 
a map with two possible locations to choose from (Fig. 1). 
Participants selected a destination by clicking on one of the 
two question marks, which were located equidistant from 
the monitor’s center. Their choices and response times were 
recorded, and the next trial started directly following the 
participant’s response.
In the control condition, the four blocks of 16 trials did 
not correspond to any manipulation in the experimental 
design; the blocks were simply included for consistency and 
to allow for a short break between blocks. In the GPS condi-
tion, the four blocks corresponded to the four different GPS 
devices (two low-reliability and two high-reliability brands). 
In the human condition, the four blocks corresponded to two 
female and two male human route givers, in each case with 
one of them highly knowledgeable and the other not very 
knowledgeable of the environment.
The critical procedure for the current work involved the 
retrospective reports (not previously reported as deemed 
irrelevant for analysis in Brunyé et al. 2015). After complet-
ing the 64 trials, participants viewed the following retrospec-
tive question on the computer screen: “Please describe how 
you solved this task in general terms. What was important 
to you when you made your decisions? Which things did 
you pay attention to? Please report everything that comes to 
your mind when thinking back about how you did this task.” 
Participants typed their retrospective report. Following this 
free response task, they were asked a range of more specific 
questions about the task, including a direct question about 
their preferences (landmark or turn information). They also 
filled in further questionnaires concerning their general spa-
tial strategies, preferences, and representations (see Brunyé 
et al. 2015 for details), as well as demographics.
Behavioral results
As reported in detail in Brunyé et al. (2015), participants 
were highly accurate in non-dilemma trials across all con-
ditions, with average accuracy close to 100% across the 
board. Non-dilemma trials were also consistently solved 
more quickly than dilemma trials, by > 1.5 s on average. In 
dilemma trials, most participants used one of two possible 
strategies with considerable consistency, going either with 
the landmark or with the turn information; patterns differed 
across conditions as reported below. In all conditions, some 
participants switched frequently between both possibilities. 
In the control condition only, they overwhelmingly tended 
Fig. 1  Example map stimulus
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to choose the second intersection shown in the map; this pat-
tern disappeared in the GPS and human conditions. Across 
all three conditions, strategy choice could not be traced back 
to any of the general spatial preferences and strategies as 
assessed by the questionnaires administered in this study. 
Also, strategy choice did not appear to develop in any con-
sistent way across time. In the control condition only, males 
relied on landmarks more, whereas females preferred turns, 
which seems to be at odds with previous findings pointing 
to the reverse pattern (Lawton 1994; Sandstrom et al. 1998). 
This pattern, as well, disappeared in the GPS and human 
conditions. Strategy choice appeared to be highly conscious, 
as participants’ subsequent subjective assessment of reliance 
on landmark versus turn information, elicited directly in a 
questionnaire, reliably corresponded to their actual perfor-
mance across all three conditions.
A direct comparison between the three conditions (con-
trol, GPS, and human) shows that direction source system-
atically influenced strategy scores. In the control condition, 
preferences were fairly evenly distributed between consistent 
reliance on either landmark or turn information, and a some-
what lower number of participants who switched between 
the two. In the GPS condition, participants’ decisions were 
clearly skewed toward turn direction information, and in 
the human condition, the majority of participants showed a 
landmark-based preference. Further details will be provided 
below, as we introduce a categorical classification of partici-
pants’ preferences for the purposes of systematic linguistic 
analysis, which we address next.
Analysis of retrospective reports
Participants provided retrospective thoughts on their 
approach to the main experiment before scoring their prefer-
ences for landmark or turn information in answer to a direct 
question. Here we analyze these retrospective reports with 
the aim of identifying relevant conscious cognitive processes 
of decision making, as well as linguistically represented pat-
terns of cognitive focus that shed further light on the (pos-
sibly unconscious) mechanisms underlying participants’ 
conscious strategies. For this purpose, we followed the pro-
cedures of cognitive discourse analysis (CODA, Tenbrink 
2015, 2020). This included explorative content analysis to 
provide a sense for explicitly verbalized strategies beyond 
the mention of landmark vs. turn preference, followed by 
systematic analysis of decisive linguistic elements that high-
light cognitive focus in ways that participants may not have 
been aware of and accordingly did not report explicitly.
In order to get a clearer sense of the cognitive processes 
expressed in retrospective reports in relation to different 
preferences, we classified participants according to their 
behavioral results. In the strategy score reported in Brunyé 
et al. (2015), a perfectly consistent behavioral choice pattern 
is represented as − 1 for landmark preference and 1 for turn 
preference, whereas a pattern that would allow for turn and 
landmark choices to equal degree would score 0. Based on 
content inspection (see below), it appeared that participants 
either aimed at consistency across trials in choosing either 
landmark or turn information, or consciously switched strat-
egies under certain circumstances. A threshold halfway (0.5 
or − 0.5) between consistent strategies (1 or − 1) and equal 
distribution (0) seemed a sensible criterion for distinguish-
ing between these strategies. Using this criterion, we classed 
individual responses as landmark, switchers, or turn, as rep-
resented in Table 1. While the number of switchers remained 
relatively constant across the three conditions, the number of 
participants using a consistent landmark- or turn-based strat-
egy was almost equal in the control condition, but changed 
to overwhelming landmark preference in the human condi-
tion along with enhanced turn-based preference in the GPS 
condition.
Switchers wrote longer statements containing more intri-
cate considerations than those with consistent landmark- or 
turn-based strategies. This was consistent across all three 
conditions, F(2, 165) = 7.72, p = 0.001, MSE = 1182.79 (see 
Fig. 2). There was no interaction with condition, but a main 
Table 1  Numbers of participants across conditions who preferred 
landmark or turn information, or switched between them, according 
to behavioral results
Numbers in brackets indicate additional participants who failed to 
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Fig. 2  Word count across all conditions according to preferences
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effect of condition (p = 0.002), where participants produced 
fewer words in the GPS condition (Fig. 3).
Exploratory content analysis
Many participants explicitly reported decision-making strat-
egies in their retrospective report, even before they were 
directly asked about landmark or turn information prefer-
ences. In particular, they frequently reported the ways in 
which they dealt with dilemma trials, highlighting their 
general focus of attention during their decision-making pro-
cesses. Consistent with the questionnaire results reported 
above, in all three conditions speakers overwhelmingly 
reported strategies that corresponded to their behavioral 
patterns. For instance, in the control condition, a partici-
pant who systematically followed landmark rather than turn 
information reported:
1. The important piece of information was the type of 
building near the turn. I feel like it is easier to remem-
ber what kind of landmark to turn on rather than what 
direction you turn in.
And a participant who systematically followed turn infor-
mation wrote:
2. I paid more attention to whether the route directions said 
to go to the left or right, than I did to the pictures.
Thus, consistent behavioral strategies typically came 
with correspondingly clear-cut retrospective statements 
that pointed to a simple heuristic that participants had used. 
Participants often gave explicit reasons for these choices 
that entailed imagining a realistic wayfinding situation. 
For example, in the neutral control condition, people who 
preferred landmark information expected that route givers 
are more likely to confuse left and right than landmarks, 
and that landmarks stick in memory as they are prominent 
and important, in contrast to turns which are unstable, i.e., 
perspective-dependent; the direction changes if you come 
from somewhere else. Participants who relied on turns often 
attended to the exact location of the landmark and argued 
that route givers may misremember its relation to the turn, 
or they may choose to refer to it even if it is a little distant 
from the correct turn. These indicative examples of explicit 
reasoning already provide a flavor of the cognitive focus 
adopted by participants, associated with different strategies. 
Participants were actually aware of their selective attention 
processes, and frequently referred to this explicitly, as in the 
above examples. Typical linguistic indicators in this respect 
that frequently re-occur in the retrospective reports are atten-
tion, important, focus and the like.
A relatively simple explanation motivating switching 
behavior in the control condition is:
3. At first I paid more attention to what I was supposed to 
be turning at and not the direction, but afterward I paid 
more attention to which direction I was supposed to go.
However, various people in the same condition reported 
rather complex decision-making strategies, such as the fol-
lowing examples:
4. Usually the landmark was more important than the gen-
eral direction. If the landmark, and the direction at the 
landmark did not work, I would see if it was possible to 
take that direction turn further ahead and the person 
giving directions may think of the street that goes in that 
direction near the landmark, instead of right next to the 
landmark.
5. I had to look for the place that was given to in the direc-
tions and then locate if there was a destination in the 
directions near it. If the directions didn’t easily point to 
a location, I would pretend I was standing outside of the 
building and then see in which direction the directions 
told me to go. I then proceeded to pick the destination 
from there.
Participants also reasoned that order or distance was deci-
sive. They would decide on the turn or landmark based on 
whether the correct landmark came first, or based on the dis-
tance between the landmark and the turn (which depended 
on the landmark placement). This suggests that switchers 
were not simply inconsistent in their responses, but invested 
considerable effort toward producing reasonable answers, 
paying attention to various scenario aspects including 
sequential order and relative distance. This is even true for 
a participant who admitted to guessing:
6. If it was clear which way to go, there was no problem. If 


















Fig. 3  Word count across preferences according to condition
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bad I am with directions and how when I get lost when 
following directions, I look at the streets and the shops 
there and go off of a vaguely intuitive sense of what 
seems right. Obviously that was a lot harder to do in this 
experiment but I tried it anyway.
In the other conditions, general content patterns were 
similar, though participants had clearer tendencies to argue 
for turn-based (GPS) or landmark (human condition) strate-
gies, corresponding to the behavioral results. For instance, a 
participant who preferred turn information in the GPS condi-
tion wrote:
7. I paid the most attention to whether or not they told me 
to turn left or right since that is probably more accurate 
than a GPS’s knowledge of where local businesses are. 
So I chose based on right and left directions.
In contrast, a participant who relied on landmarks in the 
human condition wrote:
8. I figured that they would remember the landmark rather 
than the direction if they didn’t correspond.
Some participants decided based on the information 
source’s reliability, such as the following switchers in the 
GPS and human condition, respectively:
 9. The proven accuracy of the GPS system was the most 
important factor in my decision. For the beta versions 
1.0 of the GPS devices I figured that the directional 
location (left/right) was more important than the loca-
tion of the other building. For the GPS devices with a 
proven track record I trusted that they knew what they 
were doing so even if the initial direction was incorrect 
I figured that it might have known something about the 
town maybe a no left turn or something.
 10. How long the person has been in town and how old 
they sound by the description. For visitors, I used land-
marks more than directions and for residents, I used 
a combination of distance between intersections and 
landmarks.
These examples shall suffice to provide some initial 
insights into the considerable individual differences in rea-
soning processes between participants, interacting with the 
different conditions that gave participants a clue as to what 
aspects to give preference to. In order to probe deeper into 
the effects of cognitive focus on decisions under uncer-
tainty, a more systematic analysis of linguistic features in 
the reports is required, to which we turn next.
Systematic linguistic analysis: procedures
Explicit content of the retrospective reports indicated that 
participants were aware of paying attention to either land-
mark or turn information, plus some additional factors, 
based on their conscious reasoning processes. We now 
aimed to identify aspects of the verbalizations that reflected 
cognitive focus beyond explicit mention and thus possibly 
without participants’ conscious awareness. This analysis was 
done by identifying specific linguistic indicators of cognitive 
focus across a range of categories as explained below.
We used Excel software facilities to count these indica-
tors. The decision to rely entirely on semiautomatic proce-
dures rather than intricate manual annotation was motivated 
in three ways. First, item-by-item manual annotation is noto-
riously time-consuming and impractical for large data sets. 
While it might have been feasible for our specific purposes, 
replicability and wider generalizability of our study would 
be hampered if manual annotation procedures were neces-
sary. Second, manual annotation is prone to human error 
and both intra- and inter-coder inconsistency. By identifying 
predictions that could be operationalized toward automatic 
analysis, the important danger of subjectivity was avoided. 
Third, the identification of linguistic markers for specific 
cognitive processes is useful for future purposes well beyond 
our current aims, such as the automatic detection of dis-
course properties and other types of diagnostics in cognitive 
science.
To start addressing linguistic indicators of cognitive 
focus, we identified references to elements that were cen-
tral to the situation. The conceptual configuration that 
contributes to the decision about landmark or turn infor-
mation consists of three decisive elements: the participants 
themselves, the direction source (the route giver), and the 
visually presented scenario. Participants could focus their 
attention on one of these, leading to a bias in cognitive focus 
that we hypothesized might be associated in various ways 
with conditions and strategy differences. These would not 
be expressed explicitly in content but rather be reflected by 
frequency of key reference terms. For instance, if there is 
little information about the direction source, participants 
would be more likely to focus on either themselves or the 
scenario, leading to the behavioral results we identified as 
described above. To address the linguistic expression of such 
patterns in cognitive focus, we identified references to the 
self (I-Ref), or to the route giver (R-Ref), or to the scenario 
(S-Ref).
For the I-Ref category, we simply counted all occurrences 
of the first-person pronoun I, including me and my. R-Refs 
were more complex as the route giver could be referred 
to in more than one way, including implicit and elliptical 
phrases. We counted all occurrences of terms that (upon 
inspection) were used recurrently in connection with the 
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direction source, namely: giver, person, giving, system, GPS, 
they, people, he, instructor, source, who, gave, individual, 
and their. There were no occurrences of “she” across the 
whole study, and the pronoun “it” was rarely if ever used 
to refer to the direction source (but frequently with other 
meanings). Notice that this list excludes neutral references 
to the instructions or directions given to the participant; ref-
erences in this neutral form would not specifically reveal 
a cognitive focus on the route giver. This is a meaningful 
(though potentially subconscious) difference when choosing 
linguistic terms to describe cognitive processes, as refer-
ences to instructions reflect a focus on the product instead 
of the producer.
The category S-Ref included references to terms reflect-
ing concrete aspects of the scenario (excluding the key terms 
participants needed to express their choices: landmark, turn, 
and direction, as well as generic or abstract terms like pic-
ture, or symbol), namely: shop, store, street, station, inter-
section, house, road, supermarket, pharmacy, gym, church, 
town, library, and building. All of these reflect awareness of 
specific scenario aspects beyond the actual choices made.
Next, we investigated the reflection of cognitive focus 
in verb use. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) highlight the 
central function of processes for discourse organization. The 
main process type in each clause affects the entire structure 
of the clause in systematic ways. The most diverse category 
of processes is called doing (or material) processes such 
as give, put, make etc.; these presuppose the presence of 
an actor along with other participants such as goals and 
beneficiaries of the doing process. For instance, in Jason 
gave the boat to his friend, Jason is the actor, the boat is the 
goal of the giving process, and his friend is the beneficiary. 
Relational processes are typically forms of be as the clause’s 
main verb. In these cases, participants are identified as (or 
related to) something, as in Jill is the instructor, or John is 
tall. Mental processes represent cognitive processes, such 
as think, consider, decide etc., which imply a senser and a 
phenomenon.
The last two process types are particularly relevant for 
current purposes. As outlined by Halliday and Matthies-
sen (2014) and elsewhere in the tradition of systemic func-
tional grammar (SFG), relational processes are generally 
found in abstract discourse that represents the world with 
a focus on facts, identities, and relationships, rather than 
actions or thoughts. This would seem to be associated with 
a cognitive focus on the scenario rather than the direction 
source or the participants’ own thoughts. In contrast, the 
direct representation of mental processes should correspond 
to a cognitive focus on either the self (with the participant 
describing their thoughts), or the direction source and their 
possible thoughts. We therefore decided to analyze relational 
and mental processes in our data. No other verbal process 
category (e.g., material) was analyzed as no specific cogni-
tive focus could be expected to be associated with them.
To address the possible relationship between mental or 
relational processes with cognitive focus, we introduced 
an operationalization that incorporated the idea (central to 
SFG) that basic functions can be represented in more than 
one form. We inspected the data to identify recurring verbs 
and verb phrases as linguistic markers that represent either 
mental or relational processes, in order to enable automatic 
counting. In our operationalization, the mental process cat-
egory contained the terms attention, figured, ignore, focus, 
thought, look, confuse, disregard, decide, realize, mind, 
important, concern. While not all of these terms are verbs 
(or can be nouns depending on context), critically all of them 
reflect a focus on the participants’ thought processes in the 
contexts in which they are used. For instance, attention 
frequently occurred in the phrase pay attention, in various 
grammatical forms.
Forms of be (which, in our context, mostly occurred as 
was, were, and is) can serve the function of a main relational 
process as explained above, as in “the location was nearby.” 
This corresponds to our primary target for analysis, namely, 
a focus on the scenario. However, when identifying these 
terms in the data, we noted that these same forms also fre-
quently served as auxiliary verbs in passive constructions 
involving a different type of process, as in “I focused on the 
landmark that was said not the directions that were given 
because often times the rights and lefts were confused.” 
According to SFG (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014), one 
main function of the passive voice is to eliminate informa-
tion about the agent of an action. For instance, in the given 
example, the direction source is left implicit, rendering the 
description more abstract and underspecified (with respect 
to the route giver) than an active clause would have been. In 
effect, then, the passive voice serves a similar purpose as the 
use of relational processes in our context: a de-emphasis of 
the direction source, a cognitive focus on other aspects of the 
scenario. Therefore, we searched for markers of relational 
and (co-incidentally) passive clauses, using the already iden-
tified markers was, were, is.
All our categories were defined and iteratively checked, 
ensuring that they captured the intended linguistic items. 
Figure 4 illustrates our semiautomatic annotation in Excel.
Systematic linguistic analysis: results
Results are reported as percentages of all markers counted 
in this study in the way just outlined. This counteracts pos-
sible biases contributed by verbosity or by content of a kind 
not focused on in our analysis. We addressed the patterns of 
linguistic markers revealing cognitive focus (as dependent 
variable) against two independent variables for the present 
study: the effects of condition (i.e., whether the direction 
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source was not in focus, or a GPS system, or a specifically 
described human being); and the effects of strategy choice 
(a focus on landmarks or on turn information, or switching 
between them). Note that strategy choice was a dependent 
variable in Brunyé et al. (2015), as our original research 
addressed the effects of condition on strategy choice. Here, 
in contrast, we address the effects of specific strategy choice 
decisions, under different conditions, on linguistic represen-
tations of cognitive focus.
We conducted univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with between-participant factors of direction source (control, 
GPS, human) and strategy preference (landmark, switch, 
turn) for all measures. We report first the main effects 
and later interactions between the variables. The analysis 
revealed a main effect of strategy preference for the use of 
I-Refs (F(2, 163) = 3.402, p = 0.036, MSE = 367.36) and 
S-Refs (F(2, 163) = 5.706, p = 0.004, MSE = 135.83). Across 
conditions, participants who relied on a turn-based strategy 
used relatively more I-Refs (I, me, and my) but fewer S-Refs 
(Fig. 5) than people relying on other types of strategies. In 
contrast, people who switched their choices according to 
features of the scenario showed the opposite pattern. Also, 
references to mental processes were least frequent in switch-
ers. No other main effects of strategy choice were found.
We found a main effect of condition for R-Refs (F(2, 
163) = 6.46, p = 0.002, MSE = 204.46, see Fig.  6). As 
expected, participants in the control condition did not fre-
quently focus on the route giver. After all, no details were 
given concerning the source of the route instructions. The 
highest relative frequency of route giver references occurred 
in the human condition, where details about a human route 
Fig. 4  Screenshot of annotation in the “GPS” condition. The second column (after the response) provides the word count and the following col-
























Fig. 5  Main effects of strategy preference for relative frequency of 





















Fig. 6  Main effect of condition in use of references to route giver
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giver were given. The GPS condition was intermediate in 
this respect. No further main effects of condition were found.
In terms of interactions, the ANOVAs revealed a mar-
ginal interaction (F(4, 163) = 2.36, p = 0.056, MSE = 365.83) 
between condition and strategy choice in the use of rela-
tional/passive processes, as indicated by the use of was, 
were, and is. In the control condition, differences according 
to strategy choices were most pronounced, with switchers 
relying on relational/passive processes far more frequently 
than people with clear strategies. This corresponds to their 
focus on the scenario rather than the self. This difference 
disappeared with the other two conditions in which other 
types of effects and preferences emerged (Fig. 7).
Likewise, strategy choice was related to the use of mental 
processes (F(2, 163) = 4.55, p = 012, MSE = 145.12), again 
most pronounced in the control condition, as supported by 
an interaction between condition and strategy choice (F(4, 
163) = 5.53, p = 0.000). These patterns are somewhat more 
intricate (Fig. 8). Mental processes were most frequently 
used by people relying on turns in the control condition, but 
by people relying on landmarks in the two other conditions. 
Switchers generally referred to mental processes to a lesser 
extent, corresponding to their greater focus on the scenario. 
Recall that since landmarks are generally highly preferred 
in the “human” condition, there were only three people in 
the turn/human category, explaining the high variance. No 
further interactions were found.
Discussion
We set out in this study to identify differences in cognitive 
focus that may shed light on the ways in which different 
direction sources affect how people interpret ambiguous 
route instructions. To address this, we identified patterns of 
linguistic markers in the retrospective reports that indicated 
cognitive focus given different strategical choices under dif-
ferent conditions.
Arguably the most predictable of our results concerns 
how information about the direction source affected the 
use of linguistic markers indicating a cognitive focus on 
the route giver. With limited information about the direc-
tion source, the retrospective reports had little evidence for 
a cognitive focus on the route giver (see Fig. 6). In con-
trast, when the instructions described a human route giver 
in detail, participants referred to route givers more exten-
sively when explaining their own strategies during decision 
making. With a GPS as direction source, the references fell 
in between these two extremes. It could be argued that our 
annotation procedure may not have captured all the specific 
ways in which participants referred to the GPS. However, 
this seems unlikely as we closely inspected the data mul-
tiple times to avoid missing crucial reference forms, and 
also given the ease of referring to the system or GPS as 
opposed to the more varied ways in which speakers referred 
to a human route giver (e.g., giver, person, instructor, indi-
vidual etc.). Assuming, therefore, that there is a genuine 
difference in cognitive focus on the direction source between 
the human and GPS conditions, this may be related to the 
fact that fellow humans are easier to identify with and relate 
to than automatic systems, which are understood to func-
tion fundamentally differently to humans (Madhavan and 
Wiegmann 2007), and which require specific experience for 
trust and relevant expectations to develop (Schaefer et al. 
2016). This may also account for our finding that partici-
pants overall produced fewer words in the GPS condition 
than in the other conditions. As the participants were not 
used to this particular automatic system, they had less to 
say about it. It stands to reason that this kind of effect may 






























Fig. 7  Relative frequency of markers indicating relational/passive 





















Fig. 8  Relative frequency of markers indicating mental processes 
according to strategy choice and condition
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common, and users increasingly relate to them in various 
ways (Purington et al 2017).
The general pattern underlying how information about 
the direction source influenced route giver references, how-
ever, is straightforward and uncontroversial. If the instruc-
tion given to the participant emphasizes specific features of 
the direction source, the strategy choices will be influenced 
by a greater cognitive focus on the route giver, and the ret-
rospective reports will reflect this focus systematically. The 
fact that our annotation system captured this effect serves 
as a proof of concept, or validation of our approach: while 
neither surprising nor ground-breaking as such, this finding 
confirms that the linguistic analysis does what it is supposed 
to do. This is in line with earlier approaches to treating ver-
bal protocols as data (Ericsson and Simon 1984), with a 
multitude of studies implementing this idea in various ways, 
including the specifically linguistic approach of Cognitive 
Discourse Analysis as elaborated in Tenbrink (2020). Nota-
bly, a mere scrutiny of content would not have been suffi-
cient to confirm cognitive focus in our study, as the content 
of the retrospective reports proved to be extremely diverse. 
Rather than explicitly stating their cognitive focus, partici-
pants would naturally report their individual strategies for 
decision making, which were highly varied. However, their 
use of references to the route giver, as identified in our cur-
rent study, revealed that they were consistently more focused 
on the route giver under conditions that made the direction 
source more prominent.
None of our other linguistic measures was directly 
dependent on the nature of the direction source, and there 
is no particular reason they should be. Ultimately, our main 
interest concerned the linguistic expression of strategies, 
both in general and under different conditions. Recall that 
participants could interpret ambiguous route descriptions 
either based on landmark information or on turn information. 
As reported in Brunyé et al. (2015), they either relied con-
sistently on landmark or turn information, or they switched 
between the two options according to heuristics or criteria 
that they identified themselves. These strategies depended 
on condition, where receiving directions from a human led 
to a higher reliance on landmark information and directions 
from a GPS led to a higher reliance on turn information. 
Nevertheless, all strategies were used (to different degrees) 
in all conditions, allowing us to examine cognitive focus 
as reflected in linguistic choices given different strategical 
choices. In the following, we will first report how cognitive 
focus relates to strategies in general, starting with strategy 
switchers whose reports were most elaborate and systemati-
cally differed from non-switchers, and then examine how 
cognitive focus is associated with strategy choices related to 
different kinds of direction sources (conditions).
Our analysis of the retrospective reports revealed that 
participants who switched strategies wrote longer reports 
than those who did not (see Fig. 2); they clearly had more 
complex thoughts to report, and more intricate explana-
tions for their decisions. While we did not directly address 
complexity or amount of detail in our linguistic data based 
on specific linguistic measures, word count is a suggestive 
indicator in this respect (Tenbrink 2020). Inspection of the 
linguistic data as well as indicative qualitative content analy-
sis (reported above) confirms this for the present study, as 
participants who switched strategies frequently elaborated 
on the specific situations influencing them to switch.
Independent of word count, switchers differed from non-
switchers in that their language revealed a greater focus on 
the scenario, and a relatively lower focus on themselves and 
their thoughts (Fig. 5). Switchers had lower counts of first-
person personal pronoun (I, me, my) and linguistic markers 
of mental processes (such as thought, decide, realize), along 
with higher counts of terms referencing concrete aspects of 
the scenario (such as shop, street, house). This supports a 
cognitive focus on specific scenario features, in line with 
our observation that switchers’ higher word count reflected 
a more detailed elaboration on specific situations influencing 
them to switch. This is in contrast to more abstract consid-
erations with a higher focus on the self in the non-switchers’ 
reports. This cognitive orientation (away from the self and 
toward specific scenario features) seems specific to switch-
ers, rather than being influenced by the nature of the direc-
tion source.
Taken together, our findings on the switchers’ cognitive 
focus add to a host of previous studies on the procedures 
and efforts of switching between strategies, which comes 
with additional cognitive cost (e.g., Lemaire and Lecacheur 
2010). The ability to switch between strategies is seen as 
beneficial and desirable in terms of cognitive flexibility 
(Schillemans et al. 2011), but the added cognitive challenge 
means, for instance, that switching strategies can become 
more difficult with age (Harris et al. 2012). In our context, 
switchers showed more attention to scenario details rather 
than fixating on their own concerns, and thereby demon-
strated higher flexibility across specific trial situations—con-
trary to a consistent strategy of relying on one aspect only, 
which would have been easier and less costly to pursue. The 
various linguistic features of the retrospective reports con-
sistently reflect their engagement with the individual tasks 
(trials).
The switchers’ focus contrasts with non-switchers, i.e., 
those selecting a consistent turn- or landmark-based strategy. 
Those pursuing a fairly consistent turn-based strategy exhib-
ited a cognitive focus nearly opposite of the switchers; they 
referred more to themselves using first-person pronouns and 
only a few scenario markers. Clearly, with a focus on turn 
direction information, the specific details of the scenario 
mattered less overall, and the participants considered their 
own abstract thoughts more explicitly, using phrases such as 
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I paid more attention to… People pursuing a landmark-based 
strategy were in between the turn-based and the switcher 
strategy. This may be related to the fact that landmarks were 
more varied than turns in our study, just like in real navi-
gation situations. While turns usually only differ between 
left and right, landmarks can be extremely varied (Caduff 
and Timpf 2008) and sometimes hard to define (Presson and 
Montello 1988). Relying on landmarks therefore requires 
more attention to the actual scenario than relying on turn 
information.
Explicit information about the direction source affected 
the linguistic expression of strategy choice through markers 
of mental as well as relational/passive processes. Without 
specific direction source information, words like attention 
and verbs like figured, thought, and decide were most fre-
quent for participants using a turn-based strategy as opposed 
to all other participants (Fig. 8), while forms of be (repre-
senting relational or passive processes) were least frequent 
(Fig. 7). Thus, in the absence of explicit information about 
the direction source, the cognitive focus underlying a turn-
based strategy was very much on the participants themselves 
and their thoughts, rather than on the scenario.
Switchers, in contrast, with their already enhanced focus 
on the scenario independent of condition (as discussed 
above), used a particularly high amount of relational/pas-
sive process terms in the absence of a cognitive focus on the 
direction source. Again, participants using a landmark-based 
strategy were in between these extremes, presumably for 
similar reasons related to the nature of landmarks in contrast 
to turns.
Interestingly, these patterns disappeared when the direc-
tion source was described as a specific human being or as 
a GPS system. In those cases, no differences between strat-
egies could be found for relational/passive processes, but 
participants relying on landmark information used more 
markers indicating mental processes. They may have felt 
that they needed to additionally justify their thoughts and 
reasoning when the direction source was emphasized.
Altogether, these patterns suggest that even a slight shift 
in cognitive focus, either triggered by condition or by indi-
vidual preferences, may result in judging situations differ-
ently and ultimately making different decisions in ambigu-
ous navigation scenarios. This is in line with research 
showing that attention shifts can create biases not only with 
respect to how a scenario is perceived, but also how informa-
tion is processed (Lepsien and Nobre 2006). In our study, 
the perceptual information as such was fairly limited, but 
how the situation was judged depended on the participants’ 
cognitive focus, guided by various factors such as previous 
information and individual preferences.
The logic behind most navigation decisions made in our 
study, as revealed by the content of retrospective reports, 
seemed clear enough; very few participants claimed that 
they guessed or made random decisions. It is a well-estab-
lished fact that people draw on fast and frugal navigation 
heuristics (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000) that help them cope 
with diverse types of challenges, often influenced by specific 
features of the spatial scenario (Conlin 2009). Our study 
adds to these insights by showing that the specific situation 
proved to be relevant only to the extent that it was within 
the participant’s cognitive focus; others focused attention 
on aspects more closely related to their own experience and 
mental reasoning. This result contrasts to some extent with 
studies suggesting that generic questionnaires can probe 
stable individual preferences (Lawton 1996). Beyond our 
previous result showing that information about the direction 
source can trigger fundamental strategy shifts (Brunyé et al. 
2015), we can now confirm that these strategy shifts are 
associated with fundamental shifts in cognitive focus that 
lead people to consider some factors as more decisive than 
others. Nevertheless, our data also suggest that at least some 
participants had individual preferences that remained stable.
The importance of attentional focus for decision making 
and other cognitive processes has long been recognized (e.g., 
Gonzalez et al. 2003; March and Shapira 1992). In commu-
nicative contexts, relevance for a person in a specific situa-
tion guides cognitive focus; sharing this sense of relevance 
allows for mutual understanding even in cases where mes-
sages are underspecified or ambiguous (Sperber and Wilson 
1986). In spatial situations, the use of specific terms such as 
prepositions can reflect selective attention and perspectivi-
zation (Carstensen 2015). In our study, participants had to 
decide which aspects of the ambiguous message were rel-
evant for their decision; different perceived communication 
sources as well as strategy preferences shifted their focus 
of attention in various ways. Since language is a powerful 
way of representing attentional focus (Marchetti et al. 2015; 
Talmy 2007), linguistic patterns in retrospective reports 
allowed us to trace attention shifts in ways related to the 
participants’ behavioral results, even when those shifts were 
not consciously revealed or readily identified in discourse.
Conclusion
Nearly all navigation decisions rely on landmark and/or 
turn information. If landmark and turn information conflict 
in route directions, navigators are left uncertain and must 
decide which information to use. Our study shows that such 
decisions are associated with patterns of cognitive focus, 
triggered by situational features, such as information about 
the direction source and personal preferences to rely on 
either landmarks or turns.
In our experimental scenario, people could focus atten-
tion on the direction source, aspects of the situation, or 
on themselves (navigators) and their reasoning processes. 
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The patterns of how people distributed attention could be 
assessed by analyzing relevant linguistic features in the 
participants’ retrospective reports. Results were systemati-
cally related to the participants’ navigation choices. People 
who switched strategies referred extensively to the sce-
nario, whereas people who relied on turns referred much 
more to themselves, and people who relied on landmarks 
fell in between the two extremes. Altogether, our linguistic 
analysis of verbal representations highlights the decisive 
role of cognitive focus for spatial decisions made under 
uncertainty. GPS systems guide our attention toward turn 
directions, in spite of our natural ability to orient toward 
landmarks—leaving us to puzzle over the right decision 
in cases of uncertainty. It may be worthwhile taking a 
moment to consider landmark locations next time we’re 
unsure.
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